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GIDEON AND BEYOND
tautly accepted by the motorist as a socially bene-
ficial device.
The great number of speed violation cases
proceed in the manner just described. However,
the fact that some state statutesm make the results
of a radar apprehension only primafadie evidence of
speeding, shows that theoretically the evidence
is not conclusive. Moreover, there is a "pre-
sumption of innocence" in speeding violation
cases, which requires "direct evidence proving
beyond reasonable doubt all the essential elements
of the crime charged" 17 to overcome it. One case
which considered the evidentiary weight to be
accorded speed devices involved the use of the
photo-traffic camera. The results of the speed test
were admitted, but found inconclusive on the
issue of guilt 74 The relevance of this case to the
weight to be accorded radar evidence however,
is minimal. The case did not involve apprehension
of the speeding vehicle, since the device took
pictures of the car and its license plates, thus
leaving in doubt the identity of the driver. This
problem is not encountered in radar cases which
include positive evidence of the driver's identity
through immediate apprehension of the speeding
vehicle. 75
The weight accorded the radar speedmeter is
less when'proper testing is not required for ad-
missibility. 76 In such situations, the defendant can
272 Maryland and Virginia have statutes which
provide that the results of such tests shall be accepted
as prima fade evidence of the speed of such motor
vehicle in any court or legal proceeding where the
speed is at issue. See also discussion at n.75- 78, supra,
and specifically n.76, supra.
1
7 3 See Gillies, supra n.167 at 65.
74 People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 126 N.E.2d
377 (1955).
175 The reader must note that the comment assumes
that traffic cases are criminal proceedings when discuss-
ing constitutional prohibitions.
176 See discussion in text at n.78-80, supra.
rebut the prosecution's presumption of speeding
by attacking the accuracy and reliability of the
radar device used in his case. However, with
proper testing and judicial notice of radar prin-
ciples, the radar speedmeter proves to be a power-
ful weapon which "standing alone, furnishes
sufficient evidence for the conviction of the de-
fendant." 7 Nevertheless, the prosecution should
be prepared to present corroborative evidence,
such as records of the event and the experience
of the operator in spotting speeders, to support
its case.
CONCLUSION
The monotonous regularity with which high-
way deaths occur seldom arouses the average
citizen to care for his own safety. The maintenance
of safe streets has therefore become the special
concern of law enforcement agencies. Scientific
evidence in traffic cases is necessary to facilitate
the apprehension and ultimate conviction of those
who have refused to consider the safety of others.
The increasing slaughter on the streets has now
reached figures only previously heard of on the
battlefield. The interests of society in scientific
methods for crime detection must ordinarily,
therefore, be raised above the inviolability of the
person of the individual. "A proper balance be-
tween freedom and order must always be at least
slightly colored by the exigencies of the moment
which may make the peril of the one seem greater
and the security of the other therefore prefer-
able." 17 Scientific evidence in traffic cases helps to
establish some semblance of order in an area
requiring tighter controls with each passing day.
'77 State v. Moffitt, 48 Del. 211, 214, 100 A.2d 778,
780 (1953).
S75 NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN oF LIGHT AND THE
Cm EN or DARxNxss 78 (1944).
GIDEON AND BEYOND: ACHIEVING AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE
FOR THE INDIGENT
BARRY SIEGAL
OBLIGATIoN or EQUAL JusTICE -FOR ALL
Throughout our country's history one of the
primary goals of our government, much sought
after but sometimes not achieved, has been the
equal administration of criminal justice. The
reasons for this policy are two-fold. On the one
hand there is a desire to protect the interests of
those persons confronted with the judicial process.
Our sense of decency and fair-play, in this respect,
dictate that rich and poor alike should receive, so
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far as possible, equal treatment for like violations
of the criminal law. As announced by the Supreme
Court, "There can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of
money he has." I
More broadly speaking, however, equal treat-
ment of all defendants, both the wealthy and the
indigent, can be thought of as accomplishing
numerous societal interests. First, the vitality of
the adversary system itself requires it.2 This ob-
jective can be achieved only by the proper per-
formance of the defense function. Any artificial
distinctions, therefore, which impede the workings
of this function should be avoided. From a more
practical viewpoint it might be noted that equal
administration of the criminal laws will inevitably
result in an image of fair treatment from which our
society can clearly profit.
Recognizing the goals to be reached in this area
how have the courts and the legislatures gone about
achieving them? Where have they gone wrong and
what remains to be done?
PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The right to counsel in criminal proceedings in
federal courts is compelled by the Sixth Amend-
ment.3 The Supreme Court, however, did not turn
to this provision for guidance until recently. It
was not relied upon until 1938, in Johnson v.
Zerbst,4 where it was declared that the federal
courts have no jurisdiction to try a defendant who
is unable to employ an attorney unless one is ap-
pointed or the right to counsel is waived. The ex-
tension of this right to state proceedings was a
slow evolutionary process, culminating in the
landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright.5 There the
I Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
2ATTORNEY GENERAI'S COMMITTEE, POVERTY AND
THE ADMINISTRATION Or FEDERAL CRIMNAL JUsTICE
10 (1963). One author expressed the belief that "the
survival of our system of criminal justice and the values
which it advances depends upon a constant searching
and creative questioning of official decisions and as-
sertions of authority at all stages of the process."
Moore, The Right to Counsel for Indigents in Oregon, 44
ORE. L. REV. 255 (1965).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Prior to this the right to
counsel was not fully recognized. At common law
defense counsels were denied full participation in the
criminal trial. See, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMrTTEE,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 49-50.
4 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
2 372 U.S. 335 (1963). This case involved an indigent
defendant convicted of breaking and entering with
intent to commit a misdemeanor, which was a felony.
He was denied appointment of counsel when he asked
the court for one. Defendant filed a writ of habeas
corpus which was dismissed in the state courts. The
right of the accused to counsel in the state courts
in all felony cases was expressly held to be a part
of the due process. Other cases have indicated that
counsel must be provided at the arraignment, since
it is usually such a critical stage of the proceedings
that a defendant without funds would stand un-
equal before the bar of justice as compared to the
defendant with means; 6 at the preliminary hearing
where the defendant entered a plea of guilty which
was later introduced at trial;7 and at the time of
arrest when the accused is subjected to interroga-
tion.
Supreme Court reversed holding first, that the pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental and
essential to a fair trial are made obligatory on the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The right to
counsel is one of these rights. Further, the court felt
that ordinary notions of justice and decency required
the result here. Lawyers are deemed an essential part of
the judicial machinery. They are supplied both for the
prosecution and those defendants who can afford them.
This seems to indicate that counsel is a necessity rather
than a luxury and should be supplied to all regardless
of means.
Prior to Gideon the prevailing test was laid down in
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), where the
court found that whether lack of counsel resulted in a
denial of due process depended upon the facts in each
case. Where, after investigating the mental capacity of
the defendant and judging the complexity of the legal
problems involved, it was found to be beyond the
ability of the defendant to defend himself, then counsel
must be supplied. This test was found to be unworkable
since practically every criminal case involves some
issues beyond the "ken of the layman," and this was
recognized in Gideon.
6 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
7White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963). Under the
facts of this case the preliminary hearing appears to be
equivalent in purpose to the arraignment and, there-
fore, the holding may not go far beyond Hamilton. One
author finds to the contrary, that as a result of the
holding in White, it becomes difficult to justify with-
holding an attorney at any preliminary hearing since
it may be a critical stage in the proceedings in that it
is the last opportunity for the accused to obtain dis-
covery of the prosecution's case. Segal, Some Procedural
and Strategic Inequities in Defending the Indigent, 51
A.B.A.J. 1165, 1166 (1965). See also, Harris v. Wilson,
239 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Calif., 1965). There the court
held that due process required that counsel be appointed
for all preliminary hearings. The bases for its decision
were: 1) that counsel must be assigned when he can be
helpful to the defendant's case and it "could hardly be
denied that it is vital to any defendant's interest to have
some information about the strength of his case before
he makes up his mind how to plead;" 2) that the pre-
liminary hearing, being the initial judicial confronta-
tion, if defendant wins here, the rest of the proceedings
can be avoided; and 3) that the preliminary hearing
constitutes a stage "where counsel is most helpful
since... 'incompetent evidence received without
objection may be given its full probative effect...'
[and] prosecution witnesses may be cross-examined and
the defense may proffer its own witnesses."
8 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). On its
facts this case merely held that under some circum-
[Vol. 59
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Another significant phase of criminal proceedings
are the post-conviction remedies. The leading cases
in this area are Griffin v. Illinois' and Douglas v.
California.0 In Illinois, prior to Griffin, every
criminal defendant could appeal a conviction once
as a matter of right, butfull appellate review could
not be obtained unless the defendant supplied the
appellate court with a record of the trial proceed-
ings which had to be paid for. In Griffin, however,
the Supreme Court reversed a conviction where
the defendant could not appeal because of his
inability to pay for the transcript. It held that the
Fourteenth Amendent prohibits inequality of
treatment which results from the inability of an
indigent to purchase adequate trial records. Sub-
sequent cases have held that it is unconstitutional
to make indigents pay docketing fees in order to
have his appeal heard, n and, in Smith v. Bennet,
12
that a free transcript must be provided for other
post-conviction remedies.
Undoubtedly, the most significant decision
applying the right to counsel to appeals is Douglas
v. California.13 There the Supreme Court ruled that
counsel must be provided for the first appeal that
is allowed as a matter of right. As a result of
Griffin and Douglas, the question has been raised
as to what qualifications may constitutionally
limit the indigent's right to appeal. The answer is
by no means clear. In Eskridge v. Washington,4
stances a person placed under arrest has a constitu-
tional right to consult retained counsel before police
can interrogate him as a suspect. A recent Supreme
Court case has applied this decision to an indigent
person in a similar position. Miranda v. United States,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
10 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
u Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959). The Court
concluded that such fee requirements were based on
the irrational assumption that the motion of an indigent
is less meritorious than that of any other defendant.
See also, Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964)
which held that, although prior cases indicate that the
furnishing of a transcript relevant to the points of
error assigned is a minimum requirement, where the
defendant is represented by a different counsel on
appeal, no less than the full record suffices.
365 U.S. 708 (1961).
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
14 357 U.S. 214 (1958). The statute involved in that
case authorized the trial judge to have the transcript
of the trial furnished to an indigent if in his opinion
"justice would be promoted." But cf. Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where a similar
procedure was upheld where the trial judge's determina-
tion of frivolity was reviewable by the state supreme
court after reviewing the hearing at which the trans-
cript was requested. Compare Draper with Coppedge
v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). That case
involved a federal statute which disallowed in forma
the Court held that it was unconstitutional to give
the trial judge authority to decide whether an
appeal should be prosecuted. In a subsequent case
a procedure which intrusted to Defense Counsel
discretion to request a transcript and then bring
the appeal was struck down. 6
The recent case of Anders v. Californial .seems
to clarify the area considerably and lay down the
minimum requirements of due process with regard
to the prosecution of indigent appeals. The de-
fendant there was convicted of possession of mari-
juana. After the trial he asked the court to appoint
a lawyer to bring an appeal. The appointed at-
torney, after studying the record and consulting
with his client, concluded there would be no merit
in an appeal and so notified the court in the form
of a "no-merit" letter. The defendant filed a brief
pro se and lost. On review of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, however, the conviction was invali-
dated by the Supreme Court. The majority held
that the procedure followed in this case did not
comport with the minimum requirements of due
process; that the Constitution demands that ap-
pointed counsel make a conscientious examination
of the record, and if he then wishes to withdraw,
accompany his request with a brief referring to any
arguments which might support an appeal. The
court of appeals can then make an educated deci-
sion as to whether the appeal is frivolous. In
Anders all the appellate court had was the bare
record to consider in a non-adversial context.
The underlying rationale for the Anders de-
cision was that the Constitution requires that an
indigent be put in as nearly the same position as
the defendant with means with regard to an appeal.
As the Douglas court stated, the Supreme Court
pauperis appeals when the trial court certifies that
they aren't taken in good faith, which the Court here
interpreted to mean not clearly frivolous. The saving
feature of this provision was the alternative right of the
defendant to seek in forma pauperis relief directly from
the court of appeals.
"'Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); cf. Johnson
v. United States, 360 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1966). There
the court determined that the right of appointed
counsel to withdraw from the case was dependent upon
whether he had filed a fully documented memorandum
supporting his contention that the appeal was frivolous.
The concurrence felt that even though the normal
practice in cases where the appointed attorney feels the
cause is not meritorious is to allow the defendant to
proceed pro se, this is unrealistic since no one can com-
pletely act as his own advocate. Contra, Speers v.
Gladden, 237 Ore. 100, 390 P.2d 635 (1964), where ap-
pointed counsel was allowed to withdraw from the
case upon an independent decision that the appeal was
frivolous if the defendant has a right to appeal pro se.
16 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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has consistently held invalid those procedures
"where the rich man who appeals as of right,
enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into
the record, research of the law, and marshalling of
arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already
burdened by a preliminary determination that his
case is without merit is forced to shift forhimself." 17
It appears, therefore, that unless there is a process
of review whereby the defendant's right to appeal
is adequately protected or unless that decision is
left to the defendant, there is an infringement of
his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
After viewing the constitutional requirements
with regard to defense of the indigent, it will be
profitable to reflect on those areas where legisla-
tion seems desirable. First, although Gideon held
that counsel must be provided for the indigent, it
did not say whether he must be assigned private
counsel or a defender. Also, the question of whether
an attorney should be provided at the preliminary
hearing or even sooner remains unanswered.
Standards of eligibility must be set up by statute,
as well as some indication of how defendants of
moderate means should be handled. Provisions for
appointment of counsel at appeals and collateral
proceedings have to be considered. Finally, there
is a problem of compensating the court-appointed
attorney and reimbursing him for out-of-pocket
expenses. In this Comment an attempt is made to
deal with these questions, especially in light of the
Criminal justice Act of 1964.
TYPES OF SYSTEMS FOR PROVIDING COUNSEL
There are essentially two methods by which
counsel can be supplied to the indigent: the de-
fender system, which may be either publicly or
privately operated; or the various systems of
appointing private counsel in individual cases.
Under the appointed counsel systems, when the
defendant appears in court without a lawyer and
without funds to retain one, the court will appoint
a practicing lawyer to defend his case for him. In
effect the system differs, depending on the juris-
diction, as to the time of appointment, method of
offering counsel to the accused, amount of com-
pensation, if any, and financial criteria for eligibil-
ity.
Normally the appointed counsel is chosen from
a list of attorneys maintained by the court with
names supplied by the local bar association, al-
though at other times a lawyer is picked from among
17 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).
those present in court." The quality of the lawyer
appointed in this manner varies, but in about
twenty five percent of the jurisdictions, there is a
conscious preference for young, inexperienced
lawyers. The reasons for this are, first, that courts
feel that these cases offer valuable experience for
younger members of the bar and, second, those
lawyers "that know their way around" have an
easier time being excused from such assignments. 19
With regard to compensation, a majority of the
states pay the appointed counsel a modest fee,
whereas others compensate him only in capital
cases. Furthermore, there is a great divergence
among the states regarding reimbursement for
expenses.' 0
The primary advantage which the assigned
counsel system is said to afford is the wide par-
ticipation of the bar in the administration of
criminal justice." The difficulty with the system is
that in order to achieve a greater amount of
criminal law experience for more members of the
bar we may be jeopardizing an adequate defense
for the accused. Even if a true cross-section of the
profession can be utilized, there will still be a cer-
tain number which will not have the competency
in the criminal law area that a specialist, such as a
public defender, has. It is true that there are in-
experienced public defenders, but in most cases
they are under the supervision of a more qualified
attorney. In any case, in most large counties it is
questionable whether there is, in fact, a wide par-
ticipation of lawyers in an assigned counsel pro-
gram."
The assigned counsel system has been criticized
by attorneys who feel that it is unfair to them. It
has been alleged that some lawyers have been
called on to participate too frequently, and that
older, more experienced lawyers have been excused
on request, thus putting the burden on the younger
lawyers.n Arguments have been advanced that
under the assigned counsel system the attorney is
"8See L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR I
CRnMNAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 16 (1965).
19 Id. at 32.
20 Id. p. 32-33.
21 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 34, where the authors assert: "An almost
indispensible condition to fundamental improvement
of American criminal justiceis the active and knowledge-
able support of the bar as a whole. There is no better
way to develop such interest and awareness than to
provide wider opportunities for lawyers to participate in
criminal litigation at reasonable rates of compensation.




frequently not compensated, or, if he is, at an
insufficient rate. Also, appointment may be made
too late in the proceedings, thus infringing the
rights of the accused. These arguments, however,
are directed not so much at the system but at the
peculiarities of various jurisdictions. It seems, on
the whole, that the assigned counsel method can
indeed be a valuable alternative when properly
administered, especially in smaller communities
where a greater percentage of the lawyers can take
part in the program.
A defender system is one where salaried lawyers
devote all or a substantial part of their time to the
defense of indigents within the jurisdiction. There
are three types of defender systems: the public de-
fender office, supported by public funds; the pri-
vate defender system, supported by private gifts;
and the private-public defender office, which is a
private organization dependent on both public
and private funds. The public defender may be
selected by judicial appointment, popular election
or appointment by the county board.
The defender system, as opposed to appointed
counsel, seems to offer the distinct advantage of
allowing the imprisoned indigent to be represented
from the earliest possible moment after arrest
through trial and appeal without any break in the
proceedings for the purpose of bringing in another
counsel.U Since the defender usually has a complete
office staff at his disposal, including investigators,
and a file of prior cases, there is a possibility of a
more complete defense under the circumstances.
In addition, a recent survey has concluded that the
defender may provide for more experienced, com-
petent counsel, especially in larger cities. 25
The public defender office has been subject to
1 See Bird, Tie Representation of Indigent Criminal
Defendants in Kentucky, 53 Ky. LJ. 478, 517 (1965).
It is alleged that the organization of the defender
system allows for full representation to all defendants in
all courts. The defender is, also, not limited on appeal
by lack of funds, Whereas, an appointed counsel is
usually not assigned to a particular case until the
defendant's first appearance in court, it is more feasible
in the case of a defendant to have representation im-
mediately upon imprisonment.
25 SILVERsTEIN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 45. Other
arguments advanced favoring the defender system are:
that it allows for greater continuity and consistency in
the defense of the poor, which seems to be true only
where an appointed counsel is not available for pre-
liminary matters, in addition to the trial and appeal,
and other post-conviction remedies; that the defender
system is more economical especially in more populous
communities; and that in many places the defender
enjoys a more advantageous position because of his
close relationship with the prosecutor.
attack primarily on the theory that the defense
attorney cannot be completely independent and
free from political influence when he is part of the
same machinery, and responsible to the same ap-
pointing or electing agency, as the prosecutor.2 6
It seems, however, that there is nothing inherent
in the public defender system which should limit
the independence or zeal of the defender, even
conceding that the way it is administered could
result in such abuses, If the defender is given a
long term, if his appointment is controlled by the
judiciary rather than the politically-oriented bodies
of the county, then it is hard to see where the de-
fendant's rights would in any way be infringed,
especially in view of the fact that the defender is a
member of a highly respected profession where
vigorous defense of one's clients is a requirement
under its code of ethics. Furthermore, it has rarely
been advanced that popular election of judges has
affected their independence; similarly, these argu-
ments appear frivolous with regard to the defender.
One author feels that even assuming the actual
independence of the defender, there is still a prob-
lem of convincing the public of it since the public
defender is "an institutional and ideological break
from the traditional notion of the private lawyer
serving his individual client," 27 This problem is
particularly acute if it affects the defendant when
he makes his decision whether to accept counsel
or not. Furthermore, if the indigent feels that it is
useless to contest his guilt he may waive counsel
even though counsel could be useful in affecting
the length or type of sentence imposed.
The solution is two-pronged. First, the public
must be informed of the importance of the defender
in our system of jurisprudence and his freedom
from outside pressures; and, second, the signifi-
cance of a proper defense must be brought to bear
on the indigent before he is allowed to waive
counsel.
The appointment of counsel in the federal courts
is now governed by the Criminal justice Act of
1964.2 This Act has been called "the most far-
reaching present day statute, state or federal,
dealing with the resourceless criminal defendant." 
29
In response to it, many states have recently pro-
posed extensive defense-of-the-indigent legislation.
Section (a) of the Criminal justice Act allows
2
6 Bird, op. cit. supra note 24, at 518.
2 SIvLVEsTEIN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 52.
18 U.S.C.A. §3006A (1964) (hereafter referred to
as Criminal Justice Act).29 Synposium: Justice and the Poor, 41 NorzE Diax
LAWYER 843, 996 (1966).
1968] -
BARRY SIEGAL
each district court to provide counsel either by
appointment of an individual attorney or of
attorneys furnished by a bar association or legal
aid society. In either case the lawyer chosen is
picked by the judge from a panel of attorneys desig-
nated or approved by him. Since the time of the
Act's taking effect, the courts have initiated de-
tailed screening processes for supplying these
panels with lawyers. 0 One of the main deficiencies
which is immediately noted, however, is that there
is no option for the courts to utilize the services of a
defender. Considering the other provisions of the
Act allowing for reimbursement of expenses, con-
tinuous representation through appeal, and the
fact that the panels of lawyers have consisted of a
true cross-section of the bar which have shown
great enthusiasm toward the plan,3' the lack of
defender option should not prove detrimental. It is
evident, though, that if a defender program were
among the options offered the district courts,
greater flexibility would thereby be achieved.
Those districts with larger populations would have
substantial cost savings as well as more adequate
representation of the defendant.
At present, defense of the indigent in criminal
cases in Illinois is governed by the Code of Criminal
Procedure.n Under section 113-3, if the defendant
is determined to be an indigent and he desires
counsel, the public defender is to be appointed to
his case, or if there is no defender in the county or
the defendant requests another attorney then
the court may appoint one. In view of deficiencies
in the present legislation, and with the Criminal
justice Act before them, a joint committee of the
Chicago and Illinois Bar Associations has recently
drafted a comprehensive report on the subject.-
Under this proposed legislation a public defender
would be appointed in every county with more than
a million inhabitants, while other contiguous
counties could combine and share a joint defender."
When a defendant appears in court, financially
unable to obtain counsel, a public defender would
be appointed to represent him. The proposed
statute further provides: "In its discretion the
court may, or at the request of the defendant for
good cause shall, appoint counsel other than the
20 Id. at 1000.
31Timbers, The Criminal Justice Act: A Lawyers
Call to Duty, 39 CoNN. B.J. 427, 431 (1965).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38 (1965).
3Final Report of the Joint Committee of the Chicago
and Illinois Bar Associations to Draft Indigent Defense
Legislation (hereafter referred to as Report).
Report, §5601.
Public Defender." 35 This report, it appears, rec-
ognizes the value of a public defender, especially
in larger communities. It, therefore, places a
burden on the defendent who desires a court-
appointed counsel other than the defender to
demonstrate the validity of his request.
Illinois, then, would rely to a large extent on a
public defender, whereas under the Criminal
Justice Act this option is completely discarded.
Why the disparity? The answer is essentially be-
cause of the different conditions existing in each
jurisdiction. It seems that in larger jurisdictions,
where it can be guaranteed that a public defender
would be free from political influence; where there
are adequate funds to give any indigent proper
representation, the public defender system may
more adequately protect the rights of the ac-
cused. If these are, in fact, the circumstances, it
is probably better to place a heavy burden on any
defendant who seeks appointed counsel to give
sound reasons, since most will not fully appre-
ciate the value of the defender. On the other hand,
in smaller communities, where a substantial pro-
portion of the bar can participate in an appointed
counsel program; where the defendants right not
to have an incompetent, inexperienced counsel can
be protected; and where the lawyers themselves
can realize the importance of protecting the rights
of the indigent to the same extent as in the case of
the defendant with means, then assigned counsel
may be the proper solution.
WHEN IS COUNSEL FIRST PROVIDED?
As previously pointed out, counsel must be pro-
vided for the indigent defendant at the arraign-
ment, and at the preliminary hearing when it may
constitute a critical stage in the proceedings.36
How far the Supreme Court will carry the "criti-
cal stage" test is difficult to foresee, but one author-
ity holds that it is possible that the test may allow
the court to extend the due process requirement to
the earliest possible stage after arrest.3
Apart from constitutional requirements, it is
evident that fairness in the judicial process de-
"1 Report, §5604.
36 See notes 9 and 10 and accompanying text.
7 SILVERszEm, op. cit. supra note 18, at 76. A court
of appeals case held that there was no right to counsel
at a preliminary hearing in a state court in a capital
case, Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1963).
The court went on to say that refusal to appoint
counsel did not prejudice the defendant, implying that
lack of assigned counsel at the hearing would be a viola-
tion of due process if prejudice occurred.
[Vol. 59
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mands that counsel be appointed no later than the
defendant's first appearance in court. A lawyer is
essential at the preliminary hearing stage in order
to give the indigent defendant the same opportuni-
ties as the non-indigent. It is here that probable
cause is to be established and cross-examination of
witnesses may be deemed necessary by competent
counsel. Furthermore, where there is a question
of the legality of a search, it is imperative to ob-
tain, at the earliest possible time, testimony show-
ing the reasons for the search. The indigent is also
at a distinct disadvantage if his attorney has to
prepare his defense from the time of arraignment
rather than earlier. The court, it is true, can grant a
continuance but, unless prejudice is fairly obvious,
it may be reluctant to do so.
In order to truly afford equal opportunity to the
indigent it may be thought necessary to appoint
counsel immediately upon arrest." This position
appears untenable, however, since, in most cases,
the police could not have a lawyer riding in the
car with them. It is probably even impractical to
have an attorney appointed as soon as the accused
is brought to jail since the cost may be prohibitive.
Also, since not every person brought in is even-
tually charged, arraigned or brought to trial, there
would be a tremendous waste of resources if an
attorney was assigned to every person arrested.
Finally, since the time between arrest and arraign-
ment is usually minimal, no attorney need be
appointed until defendant's initial court appear-
ance except where he is interrogated.
The Criminal Justice Act can again be cited as
presenting the modem point of view on the sub-
ject. Section (c) requires that the defendant be
represented from his initial court appearance.
From a cursory reading of the Connecticut Plan
for implementing the Criminal Justice Act in the
Connecticut District Court, it seems that the
defendant's rights are extended considerably. It
states that if it is determined that the defendant is
unable to obtain counsel, this information must be
promptly brought to the attention of a magistrate
n See Bird, supra note 24, at 493-94. "A need for
assistance of counsel is by no means limited to the
confines of the courtroom or the time actually spent in
the courtroom proceedings. Rather, the need exists
whenever 'that which is simple, orderly, and necessary
to the lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear
intricate, complex, and mysterious.' Thus, it exists
whenever a person's procedural or substantive rights
are endangered because of his ignorance or inexperience.
Such is the defendant's situation immediately after
arrest." Bird, supra at 491.
who will appoint an attorney.39 Considering the
difficulties inherent in the appointment of counsel
to everyone arrested, a logical interpretation of the
Plan would be that the accused should be arraigned
as soon as possible after arrest and an attorney
would then be appointed if the defendant was un-
able to retain one.
By way of comparison, the Illinois Criminal
Code provides for appointment of a defender or
other counsel before pleading to the charge. If the
defendant has not been able to obtain counsel be-
fore pleading, then, after one is appointed a con-
tinuance is to be allowed to enable the defendant
to consult with him.4 This provision should put
the indigent on as equal footing with the de-
fendant with means as is practicable.
A third approach to the problem, and the most
liberal of all, was adopted by the drafters of the
proposed legislation in South Carolina. This legisla-
tion requires that any defendant charged with a
crime must be told of his right to counsel. Under
South Carolina law the defendant is charged with a
crime at the time of arrest. One authority, there-
fore, assumes that the new legislation means that
the accused must be supplied with counsel within a
reasonable time after arrest.4' Here, again, the
provision may be read to allow for counsel at the
arraignment if this stage comes within a reasonable
time after arrest.
METHODS OF DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY
At present eligibility of the defendant for ap-
pointed counsel is determined either by his response
to the simple question of a court whether he can
"afford counsel", or by the answers to various
forms concerning employment, ownership of an
automobile or other property.42 Courts have also
regarded the ability to secure release on bail as
some indication that the defendant can afford his
39Timbers, supra note 31, 430.40 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §113-3(a) (1965).41 Proposed Defense of the Indigent Legislation in
South Carolina, 18 S. CAR. L. Rav. 380 (1966).
4 2SILVERsTErI, op. cit. supra note 16, at 106. The
author raises the interesting question of whether the
requirement that the defendant must file a sworn
statement regarding his assets may be a violation of
his privilege against self incrimination since the state-
ment might subsequently be used against him. If the
statements were taken by the defender then the answer
is that they are protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege. Furthermore, even if this statement were sub-
mitted to the court, the defendant could always be
granted immunity. Finally, if failure to have defendant
submit such a statement would effectively deprive him
of the right to counsel, then it may be that such state-
ments could not be constitutionally used against him.
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own attorney. Gross inequities will appear if this is
accepted as a test by itself, however. What if the
defendant receives the money for bail from a rela-
tive? What if he has spent the last of his money for
release so that he could retain employment? Unless
the circumstances surrounding release or bail are
examined the defendant may be greatly prejudiced.
As to other criteria for elibigility there will be differ-
ent results in different cases. Where the community
is small and the judge knows the defendant, then
no detailed forms are required. However, in larger
cities, where the defendant is not known, a written
questionnaire should be filled out, unless there is a
defender who has investigators on his staff with
the ability to make at least a preliminary deter-
mination of eligibility. The final conclusion seems
to be that the less investigation necessary the
better off we are from a point of view of expense
and time allotment, which could be used by the
defense attorney in preparing his case. But, on the
other hand, before assignment is made the court
should be satisfied that the defendant cannot afford
his own attorney.
What about the defendant with some available
funds but not enough to pay for a lawyer? What if
the defendant can afford a lawyer but not inves-
tigative services or expert witnesses? According to
the Attorney General's Committee report, total
lack of funds should not be the criterion for eli-
gibility.4 Furthermore, if, during the trial, the
defendant becomes financially incapable of paying
for his lawyer because of the length of the pro-
ceedings or other reasons, the government should
step in to see that he gets adequate representation.
This conclusion rests on the theory that "whenever
financial incapacity prevents the defense from
providing active and creative challenges to asser-
tions of governmental power in the criminal area,
the adversary system, and the public interest de-
pendent upon it, are placed in jeopardy." 4
The Criminal Justice Act provides for sub-
stantial flexibility in this situation. It states merely
that unless the defendant waives counsel one shall
be appointed for him, if after "appropriate in-
quiry" the defendant is found financially unable to
ATromNEY GEN.RA'S Coawmn EE, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 7. The Committee concluded that poverty
does not mean total lack of resources, but rather a lack
of sufficient means to permit the accused to hire compe-
tent counsel or to obtain necessary services. "Poverty
must be viewed as a relative to the particular need or
service under consideration."
"Id. at 40.
obtain counsel.4 5 The establishment of standards
for determining the extent of inquiry is left to the
districts, although forms have been issued by the
government to be completed by the defendant
showing assets, employment, compensation, and
dependents. This flexibility seems to be a recogni-
tion of the fact that the complexity and number
of questions to be asked is dependent on such
factors as size of the district, severity of the crime,
and whether bail has been provided.
To encompass defendants with some means, the
Act purposely avoids use to the term indigent.
Rather, it uses the standard 'fnancially unable to
obtain counsel," 46 since the constitutional right to
an attorney is not based on destitution but on
lack of sufficient resources to retain counsel.
Section (c) further allows for termination of ap-
pointed counsel if it is later found defendant has
sufficient means to retain one, or authorizes con-
tribution by the defendant.0 The Act is noticeably
silent with regard to the defendant who can afford
counsel but not other necessary services, with the
exception of expert witnesses.
The present Illinois Criminal Code also fails to
provide standards for the determination of in-
digency. It states that if the Court determines that
the defendant is in need of a lawyer and is indigent
a defender is to be appointed.43 What "indigent"
means under particular facts is apparently left to
the courts. The proposed legislation in Illinois
recognizes this deficiency in the Code and provides
for a hearing to determine whether the defendant
is "financially unable to obtain competent coun-
sel." 49 Assuming that the criteria of "financially
unable to obtain competent counsel" will receive
the same interpretation as under the Criminal
Justice Act, the problems under both will be iden-
tical. There still remains the questions of what
happens to the defendant who can not afford a
complete defense or who becomes indigent at some
point in the proceedings against him.
41 Criminal Justice Act, §(b).
46 Id.
47 Section (c) also provides that if a defendant who
has retained counsel later becomes unable to pay him,
the court may appoint counsel for him.
4' ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 38, §113-3(b) (1965). Among
the individual counties, the standard in Cook County
generally is if the defendant can't post bail then he is
asked whether he has a lawyer; if not, whether he has
funds to hire one. Some judges consider other factors
such as employment and ownership of assets. See
Dowling & Yantis, Defense of the Poor in Criminal





The proposed South Carolina legislation is again
more precise in this area than any of the other
statutes heretofore encountered. This act applies
to any defendant who is "financially unable to
obtain an adequate defense." 10 Furthermore, four
other standards are set up to determine whether
the defendant is eligible under the act to have a
counsel appointed for his case. He must be finan-
cially unable to (1) obtain representation; (2) ob-
tain counsel; (3) pay counsel whom he has re-
tained; or (4) obtain investigative, expert or other
services necessary for an adequate defense. Even
though the Act has been criticized as being too
inflexible and not giving enough discretion to the
administrator,5' clearly, without some guidance
there might be arbitrary results.
COUNSEL FOR MISDEMEANORS
The decision in Gideon was limited on its facts
to felony cases, but the Supreme Court could
easily use the same reasoning in extending the
Sixth Amendment protection to defendant accused
of misdemeanors. Such a result has been accom-
plished in a number of court of Appeals decisionsn
and in New York both by judicial decision and by
statute.53 At present only about 25% of the
counties in the country provide counsel for mis-
demeanors,u a situation praised by many promi-
50 See Proposed Defense of Sie Indigent Act in South
Carolita, supra note 41, at 397. The wording here is a
vast improvement over other legislation since "adequate
defense" clearly implies that if the defendant doesn't
have the means for a complete defense including in-
vestigative devices, expert witnesses, as well as an
attorney, they will be provided.
51Id. at 406.
52 In Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir.
1965), the Fifth Circuit applied the Gideon decision to a
case of unlawful possession of whiskey where the
defendant was sentenced to 90 days in jail and fined
$500. In McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir.
1965), the court held it unconstitutional not to supply
an indigent with counsel where he was arrested for
unlawful possession and sale of whiskey with a penalty
of six months in jail and a $250 fine. The court also
pointed out that the Gideon rule should not be extended
to "a person in a municipal court charged with beingdrunk and disorderly" or a person given a traffic ticket.
See also Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966) (dissent-
ing memorandum to denial of certiorari), where Justice
Stewart pointed out that the court in Gideon made no
distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. "Any
person," the Court had said in Gideon, "hauled into
court who is too poor to hire a lawyer can not be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."
5People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.2d
358 (1965). N.Y. CouNTY LAw, §722e (1965), where
sentence is more than six months or fine is more than
$500.
SA n~vnasTE, op. cit. supra, at 125. The author
notes that counsel is usually not provided for indigents
nent jurists." It can not be denied that an indigent
who must face the trial of a misdemeanor charge
may--depending upon the complexity of the case
-be as handicapped as the felony defendant who
was not provided counsel before Gideon. Mis-
demeanor cases, for example, may involve motions
to suppress confessions or physical evidence, or
may call into play technical rules of evidence.
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Under the Criminal Justice Act a lawyer is to be
appointed to the indigent in cases where he is
charged with a felony or misdemeanor, other than
a "petty offense." 5 Flexibility is maintained in
the proposed South Carolina statute which re-
quires the appointment of counsel in cases where
the crime charged carries a penalty of six months
or more and in other cases if warranted. The
proposed Illinois legislation merely authorizes
appointment in every case where a person is
charged with any criminal offense. 9 This goes too
far. It forces the state to supply counsel to the
in misdemeanors except 1) in cases of high misdemean-
ors, 2) where tried by a court of general jurisdiction,
3) where counsel is provided for trial only, or 4) where
specifically requested.
is See, e.g., Traynor's concurring opinion in People v.
Brown, 55 Cal. 2d 64, 70, 357 P.2d 1072, 1076 (1960),
where he digresses from the point of the case to indicate
that appointment of counsel should be limited to
felonies and not misdemeanors. He feels that misde-
meanors are circumstantially less serious than felonies;
that the defendant has an absolute right to bail; his
incarceration will be brief; and the judge may allow
him to serve his time outside working hours, so that he
can retain counsel.
5 cf. Justice Clark's concurring opinion in Gideon
v. Wainwright where it was stated that since prior
decisions had found it unconstitutional not to provide
counsel in capital cases, it was said to be equally
unconstitutional not to supply an attorney in a non-
capital case. The Fourteenth Amendment makes no
distinction between being deprived of "life or liberty
without due process of law." Similarly, there is no
logical distinction between one year's liberty and
nine months. See also Bird, supra note 24 at 488-90,
here the author reasons that the distinction is unfair to
the defendant who is just as effectively deprived of his
liberty by imprisonment for one year for a misdemeanor
as for a felony. He concedes, however, that it is im-
practical to extend Gideon to such minor offenses as
traffic violations, vagrancy, drunkenness, etc. One
attorney, interviewed in a recent survey, answered
that, "Experience has shown that there is greater
possibility of miscarriage of justice at the misdemeanor
level" than in situations involving the commission of a
felony. This is due, in part, to the fact that before a
trial and conviction or acquittal in a felony case there
must have been a preliminary screening of evidence
before a grand jury or committing magistrate. SxivxR-
sTIN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 132.
67 Criminal Justice Act, §(b).58 Proposed Defense of the Indigent Legislation in




indigent at substantial expense where even the
defendant with means might not, as a practical
matter, be represented.
COUNSEL FOR POST-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
The law is settled that counsel must be provided
the indigent at the first appeal which he is afforded
as of right, and, further, a transcript of the trial
record must also be supplied.60 Questions persist as
to the requirement of counsel at other post-trial
proceedings. What about subsequent appeals,
habeas corpus proceedings, and probation or
parole revocation hearings?
As to subsequent appeals, no distinction is made
between the first and second appeals in any of the
legislation heretofore considered. The Criminal
justice Act, for example, authorizes the appoint-
ment of counsel to continue through appeal. Con-
sidering the liberality of the act and its broad con-
cern with the rights of criminal defendants, it
should be interpreted to require the appointed
attorney to prosecute any claims the defendant
might have beyond the appeal which he has as a
matter of right, unless clearly frivolous.
As to subsequent collateral proceedings, the
Supreme Court appears reluctant to require
counsel for all such matters, but it has laid down
the rule that where a substantial claim is presented
requiring a full evidentiary hearing "the sentencing
court might find it useful to appoint counsel." 61
Even absent a judicial mandate, however, this
does not seem to be a problem area, since about
76% of the states provide counsel for post-convic-
tion remedies to some extent.1
2
There have been two lines of argument with
regard to the desirability of providing counsel at
habeas corpus proceedings. One view holds that
these are merely civil proceedings and counsel is
therefore not required under the Sixth Amend-
ment.6 With equal force it can be pointed out that
regardless of history, habeas corpus proceedings are
now considered as extended appeals and, since the
defendant could not be expected to handle the
complex issues involved in an appeal, he should not
be forced to make a choice whether to argue his
own case for habeas corpus or avoid it altogether.
As the proponents of extending Gideon to these
cases argue, in habeas corpus proceedings federal
60 See text accompanying footnotes 11-15.
61 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 21 (1963).
62 SILVERSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 25, at 141. But see
Whitney v. Florida, 389 U. S. 138 (1967) (dissenting
opinion).
63 Id. at 142.
courts are under an obligation to provide a fair
hearing. When this requires representation of a
petitioner by counsel, and the petitioner lacks
adequate means to hire one, then counsel should be
appointed." It may be a more stable foundation to
rest the government's obligation on the equal
protection clause since, unless counsel is pro-
vided, the indigent will surely be in a less advan-
tageous position than other defendants. In any
case, in order to be consistent with our modem
concepts of fairness, the defendant who cannot
afford one should have a lawyer appointed for
habeas corpus proceedings, at least absent a show-
ing of frivolity. It is difficult to justify the absence
of a provision for counsel at these hearings under
the Criminal Justice Act. Recognizing this de-
ficiency both the proposed South Carolina and
Illinois statutes provide for counsel at habeas
corpus proceedings.
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Provision for appointed counsel at parole rev-
ocation hearings has been required in at least one
state by judicial decision. 6" This has not been gen-
erally accepted and at present there is no similar
provision in the federal courts." Here, again, the
argument persists that parole revocation hearings
are merely administrative proceedings. Further-
more, since parole and conditional release are
matters of grace they can be terminated at will
without following procedural requirements. It
should be recognized, however, that the defendant
has been released, even though conditionally and
not as a matter of right. Still, fairness in our crim-
inal system demands that the decision of parole
revocation should be made with a knowledge of
all the facts, which necessitates cross examination
of witnesses, presentation of opposing viewpoints,
and a general knowledge of the law. Absence of
counsel, therefore, under these circumstances can
not be justified, and, as previously mentioned, an
14 ATToumr GENaRA's COmMITTEE, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 45.
11 Report, §5614, and .Proposed Defense of thMe Indigent
Legislation in Sotdh Carolina, supra note 41, at 400.
1
6 Commonwealth ex. rd. Remeriez v. Maroney,
415 Pa. 534, 204 A.2d 451 (1964).
67The regulations of the Federal Board of Parole
require that every alleged parole violator be informed
that he may be represented by counsel and voluntary
witnesses will be allowed to testify on his behalf, but
counsel is only authorized where it can be arranged by
the prisoner. There is no provision for appointment of
counsel for an indigent prisoner. See F.R. (August 24,
1962) 8487-8491, §§2.40 and 2.41, cited in ATRNEY
GENERAL'S ComITTEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 46-7.
The Supreme Court has recently held that due process
requires the appointment of counsel at probation
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Prior to the Criminal Justice Act the Federal
courts and a substantial minority of the state
courts did not authorize compensation of ap-
pointed counsel in criminal cases. This practice was
strongly criticized as being prejudicial to both the
defendant and the legal profession. 68 Since pro-
viding equal justice to all by supplying competent
counsel to the indigent is a function of the society
as a whole, the burden of paying for defending the
indigent should be on it rather than the legal pro-
fession.69
From the defendant's viewpoint it is obvious
that he will not be getting the protection that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires unless the at-
torney appointed to defend him is able to advance
his cause with as much determination and zeal as a
retained counsel in a similar case. But if the ap-
pointed counsel is forced to make a choice whether
to devote certain time to a fee-paying client or to
an indigent, it is inevitable that the indigent's
defense will suffer. It has been pointed out, too, that
an appointed counsel may unconsciously weigh the
vigor which he pursues the defendant's cause
against his concern that he may incur the enmity
of the court and the prosecution on behalf of a
client who can not even pay for his services. 0
Finally, appointed counsel will rarely be able to
afford investigative and other essential services
unless he is reimbursed for them.
The Criminal Justice Act, in recognition of the
plight of the uncompensated attorney, allows for
payment at $15 an hour for in-court time and $10
0 There is also a question of whether forcing a
lawyer to serve without compensation is taking his
property; i.e., services, without due process of law.
One court of appeals case was decided against the
lawyer on this point. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d
633 (9th Cir. 1965). A Kentucky court reaching the
same result said that the traditional concept of the
lawyer as an officer of the court still has some validity.
Warner v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1966).
A New Jersey court finding for the attorney concluded,
"The crucial question is whether this court should
continue to require the members of the bar to absorb
the full cost of the defense of the indigent.... This
court is satisfied that the present day burden is more
than the profession alone should shoulder and hence is
compelled to relieve the profession of it." State v. Rush,
46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441, 448-49 (1966).
61 See, e.g., Silverstein, Defense of the Poor-A
Nationzl Dilemmna, 14 LA. B.J. 103 (1966).
70 Segal, The Indigent Defendant and the Defense
Counsel, 45 PRISON JouaRA. 16 (1965).
per hour outside of court, with a maximum of
$500 for felonies and $300 for a misdemeanor."
It authorizes reimbursement of out-of-pocket ex-
penses to assigned counsel and to those who render
investigative, expert or other services with a limit
of $300 for each person. The ceilings placed on the
hourly compensation of appointed counsel are
extremely low when compared to the rates of re-
tained lawyers. They may be justified, however,
on the theory that the Act balances the need for
compensating the attorney with his duty as an
officer of the court. In any case, the absolute
maximum on compensation and expenses is grossly
unfair since the trial court should be able to deter-
mine whether a requested amount is reasonable or
not. Under the South Carolina statute no limit is
placed on the expenses incurred except that they
must be reasonable.
CONCLUSIONS
Equal protection of the laws guarantees that
there be no arbitrary classification of persons in the
administration of the criminal laws. Since the
normal defendant cannot be expected to under-
stand the technicalities of the judicial proceedings
and therefore present his own defense, can it
honestly be stated that if an indigent is not sup-
plied with counsel to represent him, he is being
treated the same as the defendant with counsel?
Should he be penalized because of his inability to
point to the law clearly in his favor which would
allow him to earn his freedom? Obviously not.
Where, then, do we draw the line? The Supreme
Court has, first of all, interpreted the Constitution
to require counsel for the indigent at a felony
trial, at the first appeal which the defendant has
as a matter of right, at the arraignment, and at all
other critical stages in the proceedings. Whether
the "critical stage" test will be extended to the
preliminary hearing or before, to the second appeal,
and to all collateral proceedings is in doubt but
from the point of view of equal treatment counsel
should be provided at all of these.
As to the type of system which should be used
there is a substantial divergence of opinion but the
answer must depend on the circumstances. The
defender system seems best adapted to larger
jurisdictions where economies can be attained;
where a competent, more experienced attorney can
aid the defendant in getting treatment equal to
that of other defendants; and where extensive
files, investigative, clerical, and other services can
71 Crininal Justice Act, §§(d) and (e).
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